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Abstract
Cybersecurity training should be adaptable to evolving the cyber threat landscape,
cost effective and integrated well with other enterprise management components.
Unfortunately, very few cybersecurity training platforms can satisfy such require-
ments. This paper proposes a new and novel model for conducting cybersecurity
training with three main objectives: (i) training should be initiated by emerging
relevant threats and delivered first to the most vulnerable members (ii) the process
has to be agile (iii) training results must be able to provide actionable intelligence.
For the first time, this paper establishes a type system (ontology and associated re-
lationships) that links the domain of cybersecurity awareness training with that of
cyber threat intelligence. Powered by IBM Watson Knowledge Studio platform,
the proposed method was found to be practical and scalable. Main contributions
such as exports of the type system, the manually annotated corpus of 100 threat re-
ports and 127 cybersecurity assessment results, the dictionaries for pre-annotation,
etc were made publicly available.
1 Introduction
The threat landscape is constantly changing. Something that was not considered a vulnerability
yesterday may now become one [1]. Therefore, cybersecurity awareness training (CAT) should be
adaptable, cost effective and, most importantly, compatible to integrate well with other components.
Examples of other components for integration would be enterprise risk management, incident man-
agement, threat intelligence and so on. Unfortunately, in most cases, CAT is not a strong component
in most cyber defense strategy [2].
This lack of emphasis on human training and analysis leads to greater issues with establishing cyber-
security requirements, cyber incident’s impact determination, and the simulation of possible attack
scenarios. For example, security requirements tend to be mechanical 1-on-1 mappings from obvious
security features and regulatory controls [3]. Consequently, there is a very common assumption that
most malicious hackers will seek the path of the most devastating exploits. In reality, hackers do not
follow a straight line while using only a fraction of available vulnerabilities to deliver attacks [4]. A
lot of those vulnerabilities deal directly with human errors [5].
Also, it is found that when evaluating cybersecurity risks, there are fixation on binary events without
consideration of fuzzy states in between, and bias toward the point of view of security management
(more technical) rather than overall business goals (more human oriented) [6] [7]. Last but not least,
common reported threat metrics can be highly debatable among teams and agencies 1 since numbers
cannot describe all possible underlining context.
This paper proposes InCAT - a new model for conducting cybersecurity training with a strong focus
on drilling deep into the shared contexts among collected cyber awareness training results, cyber
1https://bit.ly/1yJcGjC
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threat intelligence reports, and other cybersecurity related data logs. InCAT stands for ”Intelligence-
based Cybersecurity Awareness Training” and its feedback loop starts with a threat intelligence feed
where the most recent cyber threats will be analyzed by machine learning models to identify the
current attack-defense themes. This angle is called ”Technical Angle”. From the identified themes,
quizzes will be sent to users (samples) within a company (population). Machine learning models will
analyze users’ responses with expected results such as a list of vulnerabilities for which employees
are least prepared for. This angle is called ”Human Angle”. Actionable intelligence can then be
derived from analyzing results gathered from both angles.
The main contributions of this paper include: (i) A novel new model for conducting cybersecurity
awareness training that is highly adaptive to threat landscape (ii) Downloadable type system, dictio-
naries, and human annotated data-sets for further customization and studies (iii) Exported machine
learning models and starter code base for immediate deployment.
2 Backgrounds
Humans are the weakest link in any cyber defense strategy. 78% of cyber incidents were caused
by careless humans[8]. The process of cyber awareness training is full of challenges. First, the
threat landscape is evolving rapidly with both internal factors (technology changes, business flows
changed, etc) and external factors (changes in supply chain, compliance, competitors, enemies,
political climates, etc) [9, 1]. To make things worse, there is no agile cooperation between cyber
awareness education and other departments.
Second, knowledge is not always translated into correct actions. For example, people who know
the types of phishing are not completely immune from actual phishing. Training materials are more
focused on teaching knowledge rather than the skill. Consequently, tests are developed to test just
the knowledge. In addition, learners are well aware that they are being tested and are guarded in
their answers. It is an arduous task to simulate real world scenarios. Finally, it is challenging to
prepare people for potential unknown threats from creative adversaries that may be state sponsored
and have not happened yet.
Abawajy [10] did research on user preferences of cybersecurity awareness methods. Even with
a ”low-tech” appearance, the performance of text-based education is on par with other ”fancy”
methods. Pawlowski [11] presented a way to map learners’ perceptions toward cybersecurity topics
using data analytics. It was discovered that learners who have been exposed to several cybersecurity
key terms and concepts, care very much about cybersecurity topics that may affect them personally.
However, they lack awareness of the bigger picture which also includes national cyber infrastructure
and cyber terrorism.
Wei [12] adopts concept mapping (CM) as a tool to enhance the teaching and evaluation of Informa-
tion System courses. By analyzing the topology of student CMs, instructors can design CM-based
tasks, and grade student CMs against a master CM. Green [13] proposed an alternative to regular
text-based machine learning approach with heavier emphasis on argument mining. The process in-
volves steps of careful annotation of a selected corpus, building logic rules or relationships based on
domain specific knowledge, and finally, inferring arguments. The paper made a case for a more so-
phisticated content analysis method when dealing with complex contents such as biological research
papers.
Joshi [14] described a strategy of ”combining” intelligence gathered from both structured and un-
structured texts to form actionable intelligence in the domain of cybersecurity. Ferruci [15] wrote
about IBM’s billion dollar baby - Watson, and proves that within a large knowledge domain such as
Jeopardy’s, not only deep learning can understand human languages and response with thoughtful
insights, but it can also perform reliably in real time. To sum up the strength and weaknesses of
Watson, Deloitte provided a good report [16] in 2015. At the time of this paper, IBM Watson has
been deployed commercially in various domains including health care, finance, insurance and so on.
3 Methodology and Designs
InCat feedback loop includes 8 main steps as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: INCAT Design Structure
Threat reports are highly condensed data that relate to cyber threat developments and was prepared
by domain experts. Reports will be analyzed by the Annotation Model for identification of key
entities and the relationships between them. Newly annotated data will be further analyzed by the
Knowledge Discovery Model which will automatically identify newly emerged patterns in cyber
threat landscape. The Test/Survey System will construct assessments based on the knowledge com-
ponents relating to the newly identified patterns and deliver to the users who are most vulnerable.
Assessment results will then be returned to the Test/Survey System for initial processing, resulting
in reports with scores and users’ response texts. Such user assessment reports will be analyzed by
the same Annotation Model and the Knowledge Discovery Model. Derived knowledge from threat
reports (step 3) and user assessment reports (step 7) are stored in database and be displayed by a
Control Dashboard system. Through this dashboard, cybersecurity analysts may correlate details
and derive further actionable intelligence.
There are three main steps for building the Annotation Model: (i) Building a system type (ii) Build-
ing ground truths by careful manual annotation (iii) Training and evaluating models. A system type
is a domain-specific ontology enriched with relationships. The ontology serves as the core of a
common language describing cyber security vulnerabilities that all models within the InCAT system
will use. A well-designed ontology is crucial in finding actionable intelligence across domains, in
highly complicated situations such as court cases [17]. However, there are at least two big problems
with existing cyber security ontologies: incomplete and incompatible [18]. The paper decided to
rely on the NIST’s recommendations for Cyber Vulnerability Description ontology [19] which was
summarized into Figure 3. While being not perfect, NIST’s ontology for Cyber Vulnerability De-
scription appears to be the latest attempt with continuing development efforts sponsored by the US
Government.
4 Implementation
4.1 Data Source and Preprocessing
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 2 was already a high quality data set so minimal ma-
nipulation of the data was needed for preprocessing. Our source was the 2018 vulnerability .json
file, CVE-2018, downloaded on September 19th (The file is continually updated). We then created
two data sets one for the text analysis and the second for clustering analysis.
For text analysis we extracted the CVE-ID number and Description for 8748 records. For the cate-
gorical data we choose to work with the more updated Base Metrics 3.0 (BM3). The categorical data
set used for clustering consists of all 6851 available 2018 NVD records with a completed BM3 sec-
tion. This data was not available for every record since it only becomes available after a vulnerability
analysis is completed; records without completed BM3 fields were eliminated from clustering anal-
ysis. BM3 features generally correspond to the vulnerability ontology used in the text analysis (see
next section) which is based on the NIST’s recommendations for Cyber Vulnerability Description
ontology [19].
2https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/data-feeds
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To cluster the data we extracted the CVE-ID and categorical fields (1). Derivative fields such as
Base Score and Base Severity that are calculated from other fields and the fields product and vendor
were eliminated from cluster processing.
4.2 Identifying Attack vectors
Feature Values
Attack Vector Network, Adjacent, Local, Physical
Attack Complexity Low, High
Privileges Required None, Low, High
User Interaction None, Required
Confidentiality Impact High, Low, None
Integrity Impact High, Low, None
Availability Impact High, Low, None
Table 1: Categorical Data
This relatively small set of features and possible values can have 1,296 different combinations. How-
ever, a simple data query reveals that only 236 combinations were associated with any threats and
74.7% of the vulnerabilities fall into just 16 unique combinations of features. Finding meaningful
clusters in the data would help to focus training on the most prevalent threat vectors and make the
most efficient use of resources. Because the data is purely categorical common algorithms such as
k-means are not recommended. [20]. DBScan while helpful for removing outliers is not recom-
mended for data with higher dimensions where Euclidean distance is less effective. The KModes
module available for python was selected for the clustering implementation 3 because this package
is readily available and specifically designed to work with categorical data.
KMode defines clusters based on the number of matching categories between data points and it
calculates the cost or dissimilarity of each set of clusters based on the sum of number of fields that
are different between each record and its assigned centroid. When validating the hyper-parameters
dozens of combinations of centroid initialization algorithms and the number of clusters were tried.
The possible range of number of clusters for this dataset is 1-236, however a more reasonable number
of clusters would be in the range of 5-20. The combination of the Huang initialization algorithm and
ten clusters were selected for our final clustering based on the elbow in the graph of the validation
data. Because there is an element of randomness in the Huang algorithm the same exact results are
not necessarily repeated in subsequent iterations.
The cost of our final clusters ended up being only 4473 which means that on average records differed
from their assigned centroid by less than 1. This shows that the data is naturally strongly clustered
and makes it likely that targeting specific features for training would be effective. Specifically, note
that nearly all of the clusters indicate NETWORK for ATTACK VECTOR meaning that being on
a local network or physical access to the machine is not typically a risk factor for these types of
vulnerabilities. In addition, almost half of the clusters indicate REQUIRED for USER ACTION.
Certainly in these cases risk would be mitigated by educating users about the specific actions NOT
to take when faced with one of the associated vulnerabilities. 4
The clustering results serve to inform the annotation and classification process used in 4.3 and in
future could provide the underlying framework for the identification and selection of Attack Vectors
on an on-going basis.
4.3 Annotation Model for Classifying Text Data
Our datasets of descriptions for Threat Reports were extracted from the National Vulnerability
Database which can be considered the gold standard of threat reporting and is being used nation
wide. In the form of XML or CSV files, which are then transformed into JSON files, datasets can be
3https://pypi.org/project/kmodes/
4Cluster code and data can be found at https://github.com/genterist/INCAT-Project
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Figure 2: Hyperparameter Comparison
Attack Vector Comple-
xity
User Inter-
action
Privi-
leges
Confiden-
tiality
Integrity Availa-
bility
Count
NETWORK LOW NONE NONE HIGH HIGH HIGH 2394
NETWORK LOW NONE NONE NONE HIGH NONE 853
NETWORK LOW NONE NONE HIGH NONE NONE 711
NETWORK LOW NONE NONE NONE NONE HIGH 656
NETWORK LOW REQUIRED NONE LOW LOW NONE 638
LOCAL LOW NONE LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH 525
NETWORK LOW REQUIRED LOW LOW LOW NONE 486
NETWORK LOW REQUIRED NONE NONE NONE HIGH 296
NETWORK LOW REQUIRED NONE HIGH NONE NONE 211
NETWORK LOW NONE LOW LOW LOW LOW 81
Table 2: Optimal Clusters
imported into Annotation Model which is powered by the IBM Watson Knowledge Studio platform
5.
It is notable that in a real-world scenario, reports will only touch a few ”boxes” of this crowded
ontology. Therefore, the ontology has to be enriched with relationships that are context-preserving.
Such relationships can be described directly by rules or indirectly by type & sub-type specifications.
The novelty of our work comes in the form of our own designed relationship rules, the overloading
of the rules and the re-mapped hierarchy of the original NIST’s ontology. The detailed description
file of our type system (ontology with relationships) can be viewed at our Github repository 6.
Human annotators must manually annotate documents to establish ground truths. For our first ap-
proach small sets of 50 entries each were extracted from our corpus of 8000 NVD threat reports in
2018. Two team members worked on their corresponding assigned non-overlapping sets and man-
ually annotate entities together with relationships. The team member who did not do any manual
annotation reviewed the annotations and published annotated entries as ground truths.
On the IBM Watson Knowledge Studio platform, we trained and tested our model using the manually
annotated entries which are separated into training set (70%), test set(23%), and blind set(7%).
Training set is used to teach machine the domain specific knowledge through annotated entities and
their relationships. Trained model will then perform on test set to produce test set machine results.
Upon comparing test set machine results with human annotated results, the accuracy of the model
can be defined. Blind set is used to test the system only after several iterations of training and testing.
5https://www.ibm.com/watson/services/knowledge-studio/
6https://github.com/genterist/INCAT-Project
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Figure 3: Vulnerability Description Ontology
The end result of this process is an annotation model that can be deployed with other models which,
in our case, happened to be IBM Knowledge Discovery.
Our original annotation approach for vulnerability descriptions resulted in a 11% success rate for
the model so we started over using a more standard approach using the Watson platform’s ability to
randomly assign overlapping documents to a pair of individual annotators. Small sets of 50 randomly
selected documents were assigned to two annotators with a 50% overlap. Conflicts were resolved
on the platform and promoted to ground truth for training. Agreement between the annotators was
calculated for entities, relationships, and co-references. In the first round our agreement on entity
mentions ranged from 0 to 1 with an overall score of .61, already a huge improvement.
5 Analysis
Some of the challenges encountered by the human annotators on this project included the inflexibil-
ity and ambiguity in certain areas of the original ontology. In addition, certain entities showed up
very rarely in the corpus making training for them difficult. Frequently, information was gleaned
from the descriptions that there was no way to annotate either unambiguously or at all. A more
flexible ontology that could incorporate features of natural grammar would make this a much more
powerful tool. Making the overall model less hierarchical and adding additional roles and context
clues would be a great improvement.
Natural language inherently has ambiguities that cause serious conflicts with the precise nature of
describing cyber security scenarios. For example, ”Windows” may mean ”Operating system”, or
”Desktop”. Therefore, even when the training sets were well annotated, the model will have issues
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with learning certain relationships due to the lack of samples. The model’s accuracy will go down
when more annotated content about new scenarios were added, diluting or even confusing prior
knowledge about known scenarios. This means training should better be done in a rolling basis.
While IBM Watson is a commercial product with verified natural language processing capabilities,it
is important to note that machine learning models learn from what was shown and cannot learn
from the details that they have not yet seen. The accuracy also depends on the type system being
used. While NIST has excellent credibility, their ontology is still being developed. There are also
some ontology tweaking required for deployment with IBM Watson platform. Our type system is
therefore experimental.
There are generally two approaches for this kind of tasks: using machine learning (such as IBM
Watson) or using logic programming (Prolog). Relationship documentation is the heaviest task
in the data preparation phase. IBM Watson provides a convenient GUI, point-and-click interface
for annotating relationships, while Prolog requires coding of relationships. With Prolog, a domain
expert has to know both the domain knowledge and Prolog programming skills. In that sense, IBM
Watson is more scalable than Prolog.
However, the corpus has to be large enough (thousands of entries) in order for Watson to learn
relationships accurately. With Prolog, logics that are known can be programmed by the domain
experts without relying too much on training data, which appears to be faster and more accurate
than Watson. However, Prolog cannot infer logics that are not built on the existing logics stored in
its knowledge base (closed world). Machine learning models like Watson, on the other hand, was
designed to spot new patterns that even human experts are not aware of as long as there are enough
annotated data-sets. We believe there is also a possibility of integrating rule-based logic into our
model for faster and more efficient performance.
6 Conclusion
InCAT is a new model for conducting cybersecurity training with three long term goals: (i) training
efforts are initiated by emerging relevant threats and delivered first to the most vulnerable groups (ii)
each training session must be promptly executed (iii) training results must be able to provide action-
able intelligence to be employed by other systems such as enterprise risk management, enterprise
threat intelligence, etc.
The project is the first in making an attempt at constructing a type system that allows the inter-
connecting of intelligence among cybersecurity related domains, including cybersecurity awareness
training. The project is also the first in designing an intelligence-driven rather than compliance-
driven or knowledge-driven process for conducting cybersecurity awareness training. Within a very
short amount of time, the project was able to provide preliminary results including a manually
annotated corpus of 100 threat reports, and 127 cybersecurity awareness training assessments; a set
of dictionaries for pre-annotation; and an annotation model capable of 66% entity marking coverage
with 75% accuracy.
Basic research questions were answered and directions for future developments are clear: (1) Deeper
research into inter-domain ontology design and upgrade the type system, (2) Significantly extend the
words in dictionaries for more comprehensive pre-annotation (3) Integrate Prolog into work flow,
allowing it to work in parallel with the machine learning model (4) Extend the corpus with more
human annotated contents.
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